Abuja Peace Agreement

The regional peacekeeping regime of the agreement was partially implemented when ECOWAS forces were withdrawn during the transition period. In particular, the practice of recurrent appeasement has been demonstrated in two ways. The power-sharing agreements in the various peace agreements have rewarded the creation of warring factions. This was done by assigning different ministries, authorities and public authorities to the various warring factions. In addition, larger percentages of government units have been attributed to powerful warring factions such as the NPFL. In return, the various warlords, such as “Tammy Bosses” (Lowenkopf 1976), appointed members of their respective factions to these posts. This has allowed the warlords to wield enormous power in the various transitional governments. Buffer zones should be set up to accommodate internally displaced persons and humanitarian aid corridors. A commission has been set up to cooperate with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced people return home.

The agreement stated that the Sudanese government would provide $30 million in compensation to victims of the conflict. 1. Reaffirm the ceasefire agreement signed in Praia on 26 August 1998, which affected the dynamics of the war in several respects. The increasing conquest of the territory, especially the raw material-rich territory, by the Taylor-led NPFL, contributed to the intransigence of the warring faction. The reason was that the NPFL viewed the various peace agreements as the main obstacles to the accumulation of predatory wealth by Taylor and his other leaders (Reno 1996; Adebajo 2002). In other words, ending the war through the various peace agreements would have made it more difficult for the NPFL to continue the unbridled sale of the country`s various natural resources – iron ore, rubber, gold, diamonds and wood – (Reno 1996; Adebajo 2002). The agreement also provides for a remuneration commission, whose members are appointed by the parties, to define mechanisms for verifying and implementing the Commission`s decisions. GNU agreed to make an initial instalment of $30 million. Finally, a commission must be set up to cooperate with the United Nations to help refugees and displaced persons return home.

Hottinger explains the context of the conflict in Darfur and the evolution of the AU-led peace process in Abuja. It highlights some of the problems encountered during the Abuja talks: on the one hand, the fundamental problem is that regional peace processes in Sudan are dealt with independently of each other, each insurgent group expects a separate quasi-CPA, while the CPA itself has imposed significant restrictions on what could be agreed. Gent (2007) examines the conditions for the successful implementation of peace agreements. He argues that peace agreements that make sufficient concessions to the rebels are more credible because they reduce the government`s ability to do without them. For example, if the rebels are represented in the transitional government, they could protect themselves from future defections from the current government (Gant 2007:5). In this context, it does not seem plausible that governments could agree to offer “everything” (territorial autonomy or total control of resources) and then remove everything once they have regained their strength after the civil war (Gant 2007:5). Why did this happen? The central content of the agreement with respect to the management of the transitional regime remained unacceptable to the NPFL. As a result, the NPFL continued to undermine the peace agreement. Moreover, the agreement did not have an enforcer willing to enforce the rules by both the NPFL and the other belligerents.