The Swiss Supreme Court reserved the judgment on the admissibility of the appeal for incompetence. Whether the discharge prayers can be made in favour of a third-party beneficiary is not only a matter of the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, but it is the merits of the case.5 Even assuming that V.X. BV`s participation in arbitration had distorted the entire proceeding to the point of justifying the annulment of the final award, the Supreme Court of Switzerland upheld the opinion of the Court of Arbitration that the agreements confer on V.X. BV rights that it was authorized to apply (perfect contracts of third-party beneficiaries under the code of swiss obligations (“CO”) paragraph 2). Therefore, A.X. could not, in good faith, object, in good faith, to the Swiss judges to the fact that the beneficiary of such contractual obligations expresses his rights through the same dispute settlement mechanism agreed between the main contracting parties: ” […] It is not clear why the applicant who signed the agreements with the compromise clause could question the third-party beneficiary`s right to claim the prerogative arising from the agreements reached under the same procedural mechanism that he and the other contracting parties have taken to resolve the resulting disputes, namely arbitration.” The Court also recalled its consistent practice that, in the case of a so-called perfect third-party enterprise (Article 112, paragraph 2), in the case of a so-called “perfect” third-party company that did not enter into the contrary agreement of the parties, “the beneficiary […] as a debtor (or obligated) entitled to all the rights of prevalence and subsidiary rights, including the compromise clause,” 7. The challenge was therefore dismissed and the sentence was upheld. In 2004, Parker Family LP v. BDO USA LLP, 2020 Slip Op 50614 (U), with investors in some funds suffering significant losses, sued fund auditors. Investors argued that the auditors had been negligent in preparing the annual audits, that they had supported and supported the breach of the loyalty obligation by the fund`s managers, and that they had ultimately failed to comply with their contractual obligation to properly review the funds, thereby violating their contractual obligations. Investors stated that they were “third-party beneficiaries” of the letters of commitment, i.e.
contracts between funds and annual controllers. The court first concluded that Sutherland could impose arbitration proceedings as a party to the arbitration agreement under the simple terms of that agreement.